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1.  Introduction 
 
An intense academic debate has arisen recently concerning the variables that 
underpin a US-style corporate governance system where large firms are 
publicly traded and control over corporate policymaking is delegated to a cohort 
of full-time executives. Various theories have been advanced, including those 
concerning the nature of minority shareholder protection (La Porta et al., 2000: 
8-15), the quality of legal institutions (La Porta et al., 1998: 1145-51), the 
configuration of political ideology (Roe, 2000), the regulation of investment 
intermediaries (Roe, 1994), and the impact of antitrust law (Cheffins, 2003a).  
Within this discourse a potentially important variable has been largely omitted, 
namely the quality of corporate management. This perhaps is because the point 
has been taken for granted. Seemingly, it is self-evident that there needs to be 
“good” managers in order for there to be companies where decision-making is 
carried out by full-time executives and share ownership is highly diffuse. After 
all, a primary benefit of a separation of ownership and control is specialization: 
executives can be hired on the basis of their managerial credentials rather than 
their ability to finance the firm or their family connections. 
 
This paper seeks to remove the quality of management variable from its relative 
obscurity. Correspondingly, section 2 describes why the presence (or absence) 
of good managers can be expected to influence ownership structures in large 
business enterprises. It also explains how events occurring in the United States 
– the first country where a separation of ownership and control became the 
norm in large business enterprises – fall into line with the proposition that the 
quality of management matters.   
 
While the hypothesized link between ownership structure and good managers is 
plausible enough, the third section of the paper identifies historical evidence to 
the contrary. In Britain, as in the United States, publicly quoted companies are 
currently a pivotal feature of the corporate economy and large business 
enterprises typically have diffuse ownership structures. As those familiar with 
British business history are aware, however, the UK has allegedly suffered 
economically because of complacent and amateurish corporate leadership.   
Hence, the experience in Britain casts doubt on whether the quality of 
management is a determinant of ownership structure.   
 
Britain’s outsider/arm’s-length system of ownership and control became 
entrenched between the 1950s and the 1980s. Section 4 indicates that Britain 
may well have suffered from amateurish and complacent corporate leadership 
during this period. The case against British managers is not clear cut and the 
paper does not seek to resolve in a definitive way whether British management   2
was seriously deficient as ownership separated from control in UK companies.  
Still, there is sufficient ground for doubt about the capabilities of those running 
large business enterprises to wonder how demand for corporate equity could 
have been sufficiently robust to foster diffuse share ownership.   
 
The fifth section of the paper seeks to resolve the paradox that has been 
identified and does so by focusing on the role played by financial intermediaries 
such as pension funds and insurance companies. This approach is merited 
because a strong trend in favour of institutional ownership of shares 
accompanied the shift towards a separation of ownership and control in UK 
companies. We will see that dynamics affecting major financial intermediaries 
created momentum in favour of investment in shares of domestic firms, which 
apparently outweighed whatever doubts might have existed about the quality of 
management. Section 6 assesses whether this “cult of the equity” was primarily 
a product of regulation - exchange controls in place between 1947 and 1979 – 
and argues it was not.    
 
Section 7 offers a conclusion. It does so by reiterating the core messages of the 
paper, namely that good managers apparently should be a pre-requisite for a 
separation of ownership and control in large business enterprises but that it does 
seem feasible in practice for the format to become the norm when well-trained 
and highly motivated corporate executives are a scarce commodity. Section 7 
also speculates why British institutional investors did not respond to potential 
managerial inadequacies by becoming vigilant monitors of corporate activity 
and thereby sidetrack the shift towards a separation of ownership and control.  
 
2.  Linking Ownership Structure and the Quality of Management 
 
2.1 The  Theory 
 
The United States has an “outsider/arm’s-length” system of ownership and 
control where most larger business enterprises lack a “core” shareholder 
capable of exercising “inside” influence and are run by executives who have 
substantial discretion with respect to corporate decision-making (Armour et al., 
2002: 1704). Until quite recently, the received wisdom was that in global terms 
the modern corporation followed American norms and was run by professional 
managers and owned by widely dispersed shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999: 
471). By the early 1990s, this image was beginning to show some wear and tear 
as awareness was growing that a separation of ownership and control was far 
from universal (La Porta et al., 1999: 472; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997: 754).  
Subsequent empirical studies verified the exceptional nature of corporate 
governance arrangements in the United States (La Porta et al., 1999: 474-75,   3
491-505; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002). At the same time, a 
literature seeking to account for the configuration of national corporate 
governance systems emerged. Various theories have been advanced, with the 
dominant explanation being that the “law matters” in the sense that the quality 
of corporate law within a particular country dictates whether large business 
enterprises will have diffuse or concentrated share ownership (Roe, 2002: 236-
7).   
 
In the relevant discourse, little has been said about the potential contribution of 
executive leadership. This is a curious omission, given that a division of labour 
resting partially upon managerial expertise is a key source of strength for the 
widely held company (Roe, 2001: 10). To elaborate, executives in a company 
with diffuse share ownership can be hired purely on the basis of their 
managerial credentials since variables such as their ability to finance the firm or 
their family connections will not be material (Butler, 1989: 107). This, in turn, 
provides the foundation for a sensible division of labour (Marris, 1964: 4, 9, 16-
18; Easterbrook and Fischel, 1989: 1425).   
 
To elaborate, those who purchase tiny holdings in a publicly quoted company 
will not have the time, inclination or expertise required to contribute positively 
to managerial decision-making (Fama and Jensen, 1983: 309). In contrast, since 
the individuals serving as top executives are being selected on the basis of 
merit, they should bring to their companies the experience and business acumen 
necessary to be effective corporate decision-makers. Qualities which a “good 
manager” will possess will vary with the circumstances, but skills and 
background that should be helpful will include an affinity for customer 
relations, awareness of the technical requirements of the relevant industry, 
familiarity with the demands of investor relations, experience at the executive 
level and a thorough understanding of the mechanics of key corporate 
transactions (e.g. acquisitions and share offerings) (Penrose, 1963: 33-41; 
Sterling, 2003).  
 
While the contribution which managerial quality potentially makes to a 
separation of ownership and control has attracted little attention in 
contemporary discussions of comparative corporate governance, the topic has 
not been ignored entirely. Roe, for instance, has offered instructive comments 
as part of a critique of the “law matters” thesis. He notes that conduct by 
insiders which is likely to harm scattered shareholders falls into two basic 
categories, self-dealing and mismanagement (Roe, 2002: 242). With respect to 
the latter, he asserts that “corporate law does little, or nothing, to directly reduce 
shirking, mistakes, and bad business decisions that squander shareholder value” 
(Roe, 2002: 243). Assuming corporate law in fact does offer little protection   4
against mismanagement, it seems implausible that investors will have sufficient 
confidence to buy shares in companies where there is apprehension concerning 
executive competence. It follows that, in order for a separation of ownership 
and control to take place, those in charge of a stock market company should 
possess sufficient expertise to respond appropriately to changing market 
conditions and to avoid serious lapses of judgment.   
 
2.2  The United States 
 
Developments occurring in the United States seem to confirm the intuition that 
good managers are an important component of a switch in favour of dispersed 
ownership. The United States experienced a “corporate revolution” between 
1880 and 1930 (Roy, 1997: 3, 16-18; O’Sullivan, 2000: 75-77). While family-
oriented companies were the norm at the beginning of this period, by the end 
leading firms in a wide range of industries had diffuse share ownership and 
stockholders who tended to lack a sufficient financial incentive to participate 
directly in corporate affairs. Indeed, in 1932 Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means 
made their famous proclamation that there was a “separation of ownership and 
control” in many of America’s largest business enterprises (Berle and Means, 
1932: 5).   
 
The corporate revolution in the United States coincided with an upgrading of 
capabilities on the managerial side. Big corporations of the era were developing 
an increasingly sophisticated “technic of administration”, exemplified by the 
rise of the multidivisional corporation (Smith and Dyer, 1996: 43). The 
reconfiguration of the managerial function led in turn to a sharp increase in 
demand for suitably qualified executives and the new market conditions elicited 
a prompt and emphatic response (Galambos, 2000: 942-43). The distinguished 
business historian Alfred Chandler has characterized the trend in the following 
terms: 
 
“The appurtenances of professionalism – societies, journals, 
university training and specialized consultants hardly existed in the 
United States in 1900. By the 1920s they were all flourishing 
(Chandler, 1977: 468).” 
 
The process of professionalization admittedly had not yielded a wholesale 
transformation of American managerial practices by the end of the 1920s 
(Chandler, 1977: 468). Still, it remains fair to say that the emerging separation 
of ownership and control in America’s largest corporations was accompanied 
by the growth of a cadre of executives trained and socialized to run major 
business enterprises (Lazonick, 1991: 31).    5
3.  The British Paradox 
 
3.1  Relevance of the British Experience 
 
With respect to corporate governance arrangements, Britain has more in 
common with the US than any other major industrial nation and shares 
America’s  “outsider/arm’s-length” system of ownership and control (Armour 
et al., 2002: 1703-4, 1715, 1750-54). Given the division of labour which 
underpins the widely held company, a reasonable supposition would be that 
Britain would have followed the American pattern and would have had a 
growing cohort of well-qualified executives as dispersed share ownership 
became the norm in big companies. The upshot is that examining the experience 
in Britain provides a useful method for testing the proposition that good 
managers are associated with a separation of ownership and control.   
 
Experience suggests that this sort of test will be a robust one. This is because 
events occurring in Britain serve to cast doubt on various theories that have 
been offered to account for the configuration of corporate governance 
arrangements in the US and elsewhere, including the thesis based on the quality 
of corporate law (Armour et al., 2002: 1716-20, 1735-36). It transpires that, 
with respect to the conjectures offered thus far concerning managerial quality 
and corporate ownership structure, the United Kingdom again constitutes a 
problematic case. The reason is that UK executives have a poor reputation. For 
instance, “(t)he amateur nature of British management historically seems to be 
widely taken for granted by business historians (Matthews, 1998: 72).” 
Assuming this pessimistic assessment of the country’s corporate executives is 
on target, a paradox arises: if good managers are an intrinsic aspect of 
outsider/arm’s length corporate governance how could ownership have 
separated from control in the UK?  
   
3.2 Timing 
 
The theme that British companies are plagued by amateurish management has 
been an enduring one (Jones and Barnes, 1967: 14). For instance, as early as 
1902 the individuals running Britain’s large firms were being condemned on the 
grounds that they were “behind the times” and “plagued by stolid conservatism” 
(Aldcroft, 1964: 114). A hundred years later, the UK’s trade and industry 
secretary observed that “the average (British manager) lags well behind the best 
(in the world)” (Skapinker, 2002). For present purposes, however, it is 
unnecessary to consider this entire period. Instead, since the question being 
analysed here is whether the presence of “good” managers is essential for a 
separation of ownership and control to occur, the decades when it became the   6
norm for Britain’s larger business enterprises to have diffuse share ownership 
should be the focal point for analysis.  
 
By virtue of this chronological refinement, events taking place in the first half 
of the 20
th century do not require close attention. British industrial and 
commercial firms first began to carry out flotations (initial public offerings) in 
substantial numbers in the final few years of the 19
th century and the publicly 
quoted company became a well-established part of the UK economy by the 
opening decades of the 20
th century. Still, the typical stock market firm was 
dominated by its founding family. Correspondingly, the managerially oriented 
and diffusely held company that prevails today had not moved to the forefront 
(Cheffins, 2002: 154-58). Since this was the case, events occurring during the 
first half of the 20
th century do not address directly the proposition that good 
managers must be on the scene in order for a separation of ownership and 
control to become the norm.   
 
The configuration of share ownership structures in Britain’s larger companies 
changed radically in the decades immediately following World War II. Partly 
due to hectic merger activity, traditional family-dominated patterns unravelled 
to a substantial extent (Cheffins, 2003b: 7-9). A study of British business 
carried out in 1969 remarked upon the “steady decline of family power in 
British industry” and suggested that “the family empire” was “being steadily 
swept away by the forces of nature” (Turner, 1969: 221, 239). Business 
historians subsequently endorsed this verdict, with Jones saying in 1999 about 
the 1950s and 1960s:  
 
“Personal capitalism and family ownership was swept away in these 
decades.  Britain became the classic Big Business economy, with an 
unusually unimportant small and medium-sized sector, and with 
ownership separated from control (Jones, 1998-99: 14).”   
 
The predominance of managerial capitalism was accepted in official circles as 
well. The authors of a government-sponsored report on financial institutions 
published in 1980 observed that “(t)he wide dispersal of shareholding in the 
UK, and the increasing complexity of decision-taking has in the past given 
many managements a substantial degree of independence from outside control 
(Useem, 1984: 28).” 
 
Despite this apparent consensus, empirical studies carried out with 1970s data 
indicated that many larger British companies continued to have a block of 
shares owned by a family (Nyman and Silberston, 1978; Scott and Griffe, 1984: 
ch. 4). This evidence convinced some that “the managerial revolution heralded   7
by Berle and Means in 1932 ha(d) probably not yet happened” in the United 
Kingdom (Francis, 1980: 1). Data from the 1980s removed any serious doubt, 
however, that Britain had moved to a US-style corporate governance system 
with ownership separated from control (Cheffins, 2002: 158). By virtue of this 
chronology, for the purposes of the present enquiry, the pivotal period 
encompasses the decades immediately following World War II. This is because 
the events taking place during this time frame should indicate how ownership 
might separate from control when serious doubts exist about the quality of 
corporate leadership.    
 
4.  The Case Against British Management (post-World War II) 
 
4.1 General  Observations 
 
To recapitulate, since good managers seemingly constitute an intrinsic aspect of 
the “Berle and Means corporation” and since ownership separated from control 
in larger British business enterprises between the 1950s and the 1980s, there 
seemingly should have been corporate leadership of a high calibre during this 
period. Instead, a 1956 report on management succession in British companies 
bemoaned “(t)he shortage of good managers, particularly at the top (Action 
Society Trust, 1956: 1).” A 1972 study of managerial practices in Britain, 
France, the Soviet Union and the United States alleged that “suboptimization 
within individual British companies has a content similar to that within the 
Soviet economy as a whole (Granick, 1972: 55, 363).” Aldcroft, an economic 
historian, echoed the same sentiments in 1982, asserting that “Britain has 
suffered from a shortage of the right talent in the post-war period, and most 
comparisons with other countries tend to be unfavourable (Aldcroft, 1982: 56).” 
More generally, various observers seeking to explain why the country declined 
relative to its major industrial rivals after World War II identified the inherent 
weakness of British management as a pivotal cause (Aldcroft, 1995: 110-11; 
Tiratsoo, 1997: 77; Wilson, 1995: 218-23).   
 
The case made against those running British companies was not purely 
rhetorical in orientation. Instead, it had an empirical foundation, with 
investigations of the comparative performance of domestic firms and competing 
foreign enterprises offering controlled-experiment evidence supporting the 
thesis that UK management was deficient in material respects. The leading 
study, based on data from 1960, showed that American subsidiary companies 
operating in the UK earned higher average profits than their British competitors 
(Dunning, 1970: 345-400). This result was not merely a product of competitive 
advantages which multinational firms might enjoy, since the same study found 
that subsidiaries of British companies operating in North America did less well   8
on average than their local rivals (Dunning, 1970: 233-54). Later data supported 
these findings at least partially (e.g. Dunning, 1988: 225), which meant that 
evidence from comparisons between foreign affiliates and domestic companies 
generally confirmed the hypothesis of inferior British management (Davies and 




British management allegedly suffered from various shortcomings in the 
decades following World War II. Mediocre talent was one alleged drawback.  
During the first half of the 20
th century, family-oriented “personal capitalism” 
continued to hold sway (Chandler, 1990: 240). Allegations that selection to 
senior executive positions was insufficiently meritocratic naturally ensued 
(Chandler, 1990: 242, 286, 292; Keeble, 1992: 45-46, 58; Payne, 1990: 44).  
With family dominance unravelling from the 1950s onwards, chastising British 
companies on the grounds of nepotism became increasingly difficult to do on a 
convincing basis (Keeble, 1992: 45-46; Blackford, 1998: 221).
1 Still, doubts of 
a different nature were cast upon the calibre of those in charge of the UK’s 
larger business enterprises.   
 
A widely held belief was that Britain’s best and brightest shied away from a 
managerial career, thereby imposing adverse economic consequences on the 
country (Florence, 1972: 367; Granick, 1972: 364; Hussey, 1988: 2-5). The 
primary motive for opting out, according to this school of thought, was that 
corporate management was a low status occupation in a country imbued with an 
anti-industrial bias (Turner, 1969: 440-41; Aldcroft, 1992: 164-65; Lane, 1989: 
91).  Certainly, executives in the UK were not particularly well paid; during the 
1970s and much of the 1980s their rivals in other major industrialized countries 
had more lucrative remuneration packages (Granick, 1972: 286-88; Lane, 1989: 




Whatever counterproductive effects an anti-industrial cultural ethos might have 
had on the quality of management, the trend may well have been reinforced by 
weak incentives. Critics said that the individuals running British companies 
lacked the drive to maximize profits, to market aggressively and to foster 
innovation (Dubin, 1970; Granick, 1972: 363-64; Turner, 1969: 431-33).  Also, 
British managers were suspected of being unduly tolerant of poor performance, 
of possessing an inappropriate bias in favour of the status quo and of eliciting 
implicit compensation via shirking (Channon, 1973: 227; Granick, Managerial, 
1972: 42, 370; Sargant Florence, 1972: 355, 358, 368, 393). The incentive   9
structure within which British managers operated likely did much to reinforce 
whatever managerial complacency existed in British companies (Channon, 
1973: 45; Clutterbuck and Crainer, 1988: 238, 348).   
 
To elaborate, tax rules effectively precluded the use of stock options until the 
1980s (Channon, 1973: 46, 213; Egginton, 1993: 353; Granick, 1972: 274). 
Also, high taxes on personal income dramatically reduced the take-home pay of 
potential overachieving “high-fliers”. Correspondingly, the remuneration 
packages on offer probably did little to motivate those in charge of UK 
companies to focus on shareholder value (Channon, 1973: 45-46, 206, 210, 213, 
232-33; Granick, 1972: 273-76; Turner, 1969: 434-37). At the same time, since 
turnover in top managerial posts was minimal, neither the fear of dismissal nor 
the prospect of being poached by another company would have done much to 
motivate incumbent executives (Cheffins, 1997: 111-12; Dubin, 1970: 192-93; 
Keeble, 1992: 56-57). Given these various circumstances, it is not surprising 
that doubts existed about whether British executives, no matter how talented, 
were suitably motivated to exercise leadership in a decisive and effective 
manner.   
 
4.4 Education  and  Training 
 
The misgivings expressed about the calibre and motivation of individuals 
serving in top managerial positions were only part of the story. It was also 
widely believed that British executives had not received proper training for the 
important posts they occupied (e.g. Jones and Barnes, 1967: 222; Constable and 
McCormick, 1987: 16; Hussey, 1988: 58). Rhetorical flourishes offered by a 
study team led by business commentator Charles Handy in a 1987 report made 
the point effectively. Handy and his co-authors argued that Britain “does not 
take the preparation and development of her managers as seriously as other 
countries”, said that “the British are amateurs competing with professionals” 
and denounced “management training in Britain (as) too little, too late, for too 
few (Handy et al., 1987: 2, 11).”   
 
Critics of the British approach to the development and education of corporate 
executives cited various shortcomings. Academic qualifications constituted one 
source for concern. There was a growing incidence of university graduates in 
management in the years following World War II (Aldcroft, 1995: 97). Still, 
senior executives in Britain remained less likely to have a university degree 
than their counterparts in other industrialized countries (Channon, 1973: 212-
13; Gospel, 1992: 112; Lane, 1989: 89, 95). Moreover, with those who were 
graduates, their studies were thought to lack a practical or technical element,   10
ensuring that “the best of the British are, perforce, clever amateurs (Handy et 
al., 1987: 12; see also Aldcroft, 1992: 107-8, 115).”   
 
In the decades following World War II, concerns about the practical relevance 
of what was being taught should have been ameliorated to a certain extent by 
the growth of courses specifically designed for individuals intending to serve in 
an executive capacity. During the 1960s there was an alleged “revolution in 
British management education” (Wheatcroft, 1970), exemplified by the creation 
of MBA programmes at London Business School and Manchester Business 
School and by a significant growth in the number of universities or colleges 
offering undergraduate degrees in management or business studies (Barry, 
1989: 63; Constable and McCormick, 1987: 12-13; Whitley et al., 1987: 30-31; 
63). Still, employers felt that the quality of teaching in business-related courses 
was mediocre and feared that students were graduating with an insufficient 
awareness of industrial and commercial practice (Constable and McCormick, 
1987: 10-11). One manifestation of this sentiment was that British companies 
tended to be lukewarm about recruiting MBAs (Hussey, 1988: 32-33; Keeble, 
1992: 155, 161; Locke, 1989: 183).   
 
Another misgiving expressed about the qualifications of those acting in a 
managerial capacity was that British industry remained, for the most part, a 
“training desert” (Aldcroft, 1995: 104). In-house management education 
schemes did become more prevalent after World War II (Barry, 1989: 69).   
Most companies, however, had only rudimentary arrangements (Aldcroft, 1995: 
104). Also, while external programmes were growing in prominence, a 
substantial fraction of managers failed to use this method to remain up-to-date 
and the courses tended to be remedial rather than advanced in orientation 
(Handy et al. 1987: 10-11). The upshot was that, with respect to the training of 
managerial personnel, Britain arguably “neglected her managerial stock” 
(Handy  et al. 1987: 13), thus leaving companies inadequately positioned to 
implement innovative technology, to exploit new investment opportunities and 
to organise and monitor complex production processes (Aldcroft, 1992: 98, 
117-18, 130-41; Jones and Barnes, 1967: 280). 
 
4.5 Managerial  Hierarchies 
 
Aside from potential shortcomings relating to the talent, motivation and training 
of corporate executives, primitive administrative hierarchies allegedly 
encumbered British firms. Again, this is an instance where there was a legacy of 
deficiencies checked to some degree by improvements from the 1950s onwards.  
Prior to World War II, organizational structures in the vast majority of UK 
companies were primitive, in the sense that top executives typically took it upon   11
themselves to supervise directly middle and even lower level managers 
(Chandler, 1990: 290-92). This pattern allegedly precluded British firms from 
adopting the beneficial American practice of decentralizing operational 
decisions while keeping strategy firmly in the hands of the centre (Chandler, 
1992: 235-37, 261-62, 286, 294, 334, 348, 374; Coleman, 1987: 3-4).   
 
In the post-war period British companies became increasingly aware of the 
success of American companies and thus were receptive to changes proposed 
by management consultants advocating strategies adopted by clients in the US 
(Clark, 1987: 339; Kogut and Parkinson, 1993: 192; Turner, 1969: 423-24, 432-
33). An important by-product of this pattern was that a wide range of larger 
British companies adopted the multidivisional managerial hierarchies favoured 
by American firms (Channon, 1973: 132, 239; Gourvish, 1987: 35; Wilson, 
1995: 216). For instance, according to a study of large UK firms by Channon, 
the fraction with a multidivisional structure grew from 13 per cent in 1950 to 72 
per cent in 1970 (Channon, 1973: 67-70). A follow up study by Whittington and 
Mayer registered a figure of 89 per cent in a 1983 sample (Whittington and 
Mayer, 2000: 174). These statistics imply that “British industry…adopted the 
multidivisional with the enthusiasm of a convert (Whittington and Mayer, 2000: 
175).”  
 
It is open to question, however, whether the managerial structures in UK 
companies really changed fundamentally in the decades following World War 
II. As Channon said in his 1973 study, British multidivisional companies: 
 
“tended to be less developed than the US concerns in their planning, 
control and management development techniques, had not divorced 
policy and operations to the same degree, did not directly reward 
performance, and had not developed the widespread US practice of a 
cadre of central staff general executives to monitor the activities of 
division managers (Channon, 1973: 217; see also 239-40).” 
 
In other words, in many companies the multidivisional format was merely 
grafted on to the existing organisation, leaving such firms “with the form of 
modern management but not the substance” (Kogut and Parkinson, 1993: 197; 
see also Gospel, 1992: 110-11; Jones, 1998-99: 14-15).
2 When there was a 
compromise of this sort, the management system was ill-equipped to deliver the 
key potential dividend of the multidivisional format: the effective separation of 
corporate policy-making from day-to-day operating issues (Channon, 1973: 
242; Kirby, 1994: 162; Kogut and Parkinson, 1993: 196).
3    12
4.6 A  Tentative  Verdict 
 
Let us draw things together. One theme that recurs in the foregoing evaluation 
of British management was at least some improvement over time, such as a 
growing number of managers having university degrees, an expansion of 
business education and increased adoption of the multidivisional format.  One 
likely explanation for this trend was that British companies were being forced 
to operate under increasingly strict market discipline and responded by 
revamping the managerial function to some degree (Blackford, 1998: 187-88; 
Channon, 1973: 48-49; Owen, 1999: 422-23).   
 
One source of intensified competitive pressure was a growing willingness on 
the part of British public to accept standardisation and pre-packaging. This 
reorientation created a bias in favour of large batch production in big plants and 
correspondingly placed at risk those firms that failed to exploit economies of 
scale (Blackford, 1998: 191; Chandler, 1976: 49). Rising affluence and 
declining protectionism created a similar kind of pressure since larger potential 
markets were being created both at home and abroad (Hannah, 1983: 146; 
Kirby, 1994: 158). At the same time, firms that were laggards in a particular 
industry could not assume that a protected market would provide a margin for 
error since reduced trade barriers and the enactment of legislation proscribing 
anti-competitive alliances and related restricted practices were increasing the 
intensity of market forces (Broadberry, 1997: 14; Chandler, 1976: 48-49; 
Gospel, 1992: 107).   
 
While, in a changing competitive milieu, it probably became harder for badly 
run companies to survive (Owen, 1999: 422), offering British management a 
clean bill of health seems unwise. The discipline imposed by market forces was 
uneven, in part because companies in the 1950s and 1960s typically were 
beneficiaries of “a sellers’ market of unparalleled proportions” where customers 
“just fell over themselves to get aboard” (Turner, 1969: 64-65, 439; see also 
More, 1997: 347-48). Also, as we have seen, arguments can be made that, 
between the 1950s and the 1980s, talented individuals shied away from taking 
up managerial positions, incumbent executives were poorly motivated and 
administrative hierarchies were pale imitations of optimal structures. The 
upshot is that, despite some modernisation during the period when a separation 
of ownership and control was becoming entrenched in UK companies, 
managerial quality may still have been lacking in key respects.      13
5.  Institutional Intermediaries and the Separation of Ownership  
     from Control 
 
For present purposes, it is not necessary to offer any final verdict on the 
capabilities of British management during the decades immediately following 
World War II. It is sufficient to say instead that the proposition that Britain’s 
corporate leadership was plagued with serious inadequacies has a plausible 
factual foundation. For the sake of argument, assume this pessimistic version of 
events is correct. One is then left to wonder how the UK’s system of ownership 
and control evolved in the manner it did. The fact that it became the norm for 
larger British business enterprises to have diffuse share ownership implies that 
investors felt it was worthwhile to take on the risks associated with owning tiny 
holdings in particular companies. It seems implausible, however, that potential 
shareholders could be sufficiently confident to purchase equity where there 
were doubts about the ability of executives to respond appropriately to market 
conditions and to avoid serious lapses of judgment. How, then, did ownership 
separate from control in the United Kingdom?  
 
To account for how diffuse share ownership became the norm in larger UK 
companies when corporate decision-making was potentially afflicted by 
amateurish and poorly motivated executives, it is important to bear in mind that 
radical changes were occurring with respect to the identity of shareholders. As 
of 1957, domestic institutional investors (pension funds, insurance companies, 
unit trusts and investment trusts) owned 18 per cent of all UK quoted equities 
(Briston and Dobbins, 1978: 19). Supported by a consistent trend in favour of 
net buying of shares in British companies, this figure rose to 31 per cent in 
1963, 43 per cent in 1975, 52 per cent in 1979 and 61 per cent in 1992 
(Cheffins, 2001: 103; Briston and Dobbins, 1978: 3-4, 13, 19; Littlewood, 
1998: 257). The available evidence suggests that over the same period, 
individuals engaged in persistent selling and thus were net disposers of 
company securities (Briston and Dobbins, 1978: 1, 11-13). Correspondingly, 
the shift to dispersed ownership that occurred when the quality of corporate 
management was in doubt had a strong institutional momentum. Matters 
therefore need to be considered from the perspective of UK financial 
intermediaries.   
 
5.1  The “Cult of the Equity” 
 
One key trend that brought institutional investors to the forefront in Britain was 
a policy of switching from fixed income securities (e.g. sovereign debt 
instruments such as gilts) to equities. In the late 1940s, memories of the Wall 
Street crash of 1929 were fresh and interest rate stability was the order of the   14
day (Littlewood, 1998: 9-10). Correspondingly, fixed interest securities were 
popular and corporate equity was a somewhat disreputable member of the 
investment family (Clayton and Osborn, 1965: 123, 132; Littlewood, 1998: 9-
10). Matters changed rapidly in the 1950s when a “cult of the equity” took hold 
in Britain (Clayton and Osborn, 1965: 133; Littlewood, 1998: 122). The 
primary ingredient of this “cult” was a readjustment in investment priorities by 
insurance companies and pension funds in favour of shares (Briston and 
Dobbins, 1978: 12-13). During the 1950s and the early 1960s, these institutions 
typically built up their holdings of UK equity from around 10 per cent of their 
asset base to between 30 and 40 per cent (Littlewood, 1989: 121-22).
4   
 
If British companies were badly managed, why did this re-weighting take 
place?  Part of the explanation was that key fixed income investment vehicles 
were falling in value in real terms due to inflationary conditions (Littlewood, 
1998: 107-8, 120; Prais, 1976: 117). At the same time, it was a successful era 
for the stock market investor. Share prices, as measured by the FT Index, 
delivered an inflation-adjusted return of approximately 75 per cent between 
1951 and 1964 (Littlewood, 1998: 120). Correspondingly, as a matter of 
investment strategy, the reallocation of assets carried out by pension funds and 
insurance companies made sense (Blake, 1995: 353).   
 
The stock market returns that UK companies delivered might suggest that, 
contrary to the assumption about corporate decision-makers under which we are 
working, investors were being rewarded for glowing management performance 
(Littlewood, 1998: 121). This, however, does not appear to be the case, as 
earnings figures indicate. The profits of stock market companies did grow 
between 1951 and 1964. On an inflation-adjusted basis, however, the 
improvement was minimal (Littlewood, 1998: 121). The simultaneous increase 
in share prices correspondingly was a product of investors placing a higher 
valuation on the earnings potential of UK companies rather than being the result 
of significant improvements in underlying corporate performance (Littlewood, 
1998: 86, 121).  
 
The reassessment of the quality of earnings of UK companies was partly a 
product of a chronically low valuation of equities that had set in at the end of 
Labour’s 1946-51 term in office (Littlewood, 1998: 121). An additional 
consideration may have been misplaced optimism concerning the business 
environment in which British firms were operating. In the UK, the 1950s and 
1960s were characterized by a rapid acceleration of domestic demand, a steady 
expansion in world trade and an ongoing expectation of rising living standards 
(Littlewood, 1998: 107; Turner, 1969: 59-60). Admittedly, doubts about 
continued economic buoyancy did become pronounced at the end of the 1960s   15
(Gospel, 1992: 106).  Still, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan’s statement 
“you’ve never had it so good” generally reflected the mood of the nation 
(Littlewood, 1998: 107). In this milieu, the economic conditions presumably 
would have helped to bolster confidence in the UK corporate sector among 
those making investment decisions on behalf of institutional shareholders. 
 
It transpired that the economic buoyancy of the 1950s and 1960s had adverse 
long-term consequences for UK companies. Since there was a “robust seller’s 
market” and customers “just got into the queue”, complacency set in at many 
firms and essential restructuring was correspondingly postponed (Littlewood, 
1998: 122, 136; Turner, 1969: 64-66). A particularly detrimental by-product of 
managerial passivity was a steady growth in the power of trade unions since 
strikes and related disruptions were destined to have a serious adverse impact 
on the performance of many UK companies (Littlewood, 1998: 136). Despite 
these counterproductive trends, however, there was continued momentum in 
favour of the purchase of corporate equity. Why was this the case?  
 
The methods used by those making investment decisions on behalf of 
institutional investors to judge companies account at least partially for the 
pattern. Quality of management was a factor that was taken into consideration 
in the buying and selling of shares (Clayton and Osborn, 1965: 183).   
Nevertheless, the “hard” information of known facts such as a company’s 
earnings per share and its dividend yield constituted the pivotal benchmarks 
(Briston and Dobbins, 1978: 66-67).
5 During the 1950s and 1960s, as 
mentioned, corporate profits were rising. Also, British companies were 
declaring generous dividends (Littlewood, 1998: 136). Correspondingly, even if 
the quality of corporate decision-making in the UK companies was sub-optimal, 
there was sufficient evidence of corporate success for financial intermediaries 
to justify readjusting asset allocations in favour of equity.  
  
5.2 Changing  Saving  Patterns 
 
The switching from fixed income securities to equity goes only part of the way 
to explain why institutional investors ultimately emerged as the focal point of 
share ownership in the United Kingdom. Also pivotal were massive cash 
inflows experienced by financial intermediaries, since the ultimate effect was to 
make institutional investors net purchasers of corporate equity even when asset 
allocations remain unchanged (Littlewood, 1998: 159, 255; Owen, 1999: 398).  
Data compiled by Prais gives a sense of the amounts involved. According to his 
figures, between 1952 and 1972, total holdings of insurance companies, pension 
funds, investment trusts and unit trusts rose from £12.2 billion to £43.3 billion 
(Prais, 1976: 116; for additional statistics, see Pollard, 1992: 332-33).     16
The flourishing of occupational pension schemes (those organized by the 
companies for which people work) was one reason for the dramatic increase in 
the value of assets under the management of financial intermediaries.  For 
instance, with respect to private sector employers, membership increased from 
4 million in the mid-1950s to 8 million in the mid-1960s (Blake, 1995: 30).  
Also significant were shifting saving patterns. The public went on a spending 
spree after the years of wartime austerity. Subsequently, though, personal 
savings grew rapidly and the funds in question were increasingly entrusted to 
financial intermediaries such as insurance companies, private pension plans, 
investment trusts and unit trusts (Clayton and Osborn, 1965: 19-22, 28).   
Underpinning the switch to institutional investment was a change in strategy by 
private individuals with money available to invest in the stock market. Many of 
those who formerly would have purchased corporate equity directly opted to 
rely instead on institutional options. Motives included the diversification of risk 
at reduced cost and the exploitation of tax privileges associated with investment 
via financial intermediaries (Briston and Dobbins, 1978: 13-14; David Hume 
Institute, 1991: 31, 34; Michie, 1992: 130).   
 
By virtue of the growing accumulation of assets under management, 
institutional investors could struggle to find enough suitable outlets for 
available capital (Dennett, 1998: 316). Correspondingly, there was a strong 
impetus in favour of the acquisition of shares in UK companies even when 
portfolio allocations remained static. Events occurring between 1966 and 1975 
illustrate the point (see Briston and Dobbins, 1978: 14-18). During this period, 
pension funds, insurance companies, unit trusts and investment trusts did not 
increase their holdings of UK equities as a percentage of total assets. On the 
other hand, since these various financial intermediaries were the recipients of 
rapidly growing pools of capital, they were net purchasers of shares in all years 
except 1974 (Briston and Dobbins, 1978: 11-12). The result (admittedly due 
partially to inflation) was that the value of equity owned increased substantially.  
The relevant figures for 1966 and 1975 were £2.2 billion and £6 billion 
respectively for insurance companies, £1.6 billion and £4.2 billion for pension 
funds, £453 million and £1.8 billion for unit trusts and £1.6 billion and £2.6 
billion for investment trusts. This trend indicates that, even if concerns about 
the quality of British management had curbed the reallocation of assets under 
management in favour of shares, there would have been continued momentum 
in favour of increased institutional ownership of corporate equity.     17
6.  “Trapped Capital”?   
 
6.1  The Overseas Option 
 
To this point, the account that has been offered to explain why investors bought 
shares in UK companies even if doubts existed about the quality of 
management has been based at least partially on constrained choices. To 
reiterate, financial intermediaries bought shares in part because the returns 
being delivered by the primary alternative – fixed income securities – were 
disappointing. Still, shares in UK companies were not the inevitable destination 
for the available funds. Instead, other possibilities, such as bonds issued by 
foreign governments and securities distributed by overseas companies, could 
theoretically have become more popular.   
 
To illustrate, consider the position of owners of financial assets in the UK prior 
to World War I. As the 20
th century began, misgivings were already being 
expressed about the quality of management of British companies (Aldcroft, 
1964: 114). For those with capital to invest who were influenced by this line of 
thinking, they had plenty of choices other than domestic equity. Before 1914, 
the UK government exercised little control over either the volume or direction 
of British overseas investment.
6 Also, London was the largest and most 
sophisticated capital market in the world and accommodated trading in a wide 
range of foreign securities (Cassis, 1990: 1; Michie, 2000: 273, 282-3, 288).  
Indeed, by 1913 foreign securities constituted 60 per cent of paid up capital on 
the London Stock Exchange (Davis and Gallman, 2001: 159; Michie, 1990: 95, 
97-98). British investors who had misgivings about returns available on 
domestic investments correspondingly had a wide range of international options 
and these were taken up to a substantial degree. Approximately one-third of 
total British capital holdings was invested in foreign assets immediately prior to 
World War I (Davis and Gallman, 2001: 58; Pollard, 1985: 491).     
 
6.2 Exchange  Controls 
 
Switch now to the decades immediately following World War II and assume 
that UK investors were uneasy about the quality of management in Britain. A 
possible response would have been to follow the pre-World War I pattern and 
forsake Britain in favour of other jurisdictions. Following through may not have 
been feasible, however, because restrictions on overseas portfolio investment 
would have come into play.   
 
The complex regulatory regime, which was initially introduced under the 1947 
Exchange Control Act and was restructured on various occasions until its   18
abolition in 1979, worked as follows (Bond et al., 1987: 18-21).  In effect, a 
new purchase of foreign securities by a British resident had to be financed by a 
sale by some other resident. All dealing in overseas portfolio investment 
occurred through the medium of “investment currency” which was freely traded 
between residents but sold at a significant premium (i.e. the exchange rate in the 
investment currency market was below the official rate) by virtue of its 
scarcity.
7 In principle, this arrangement restricted new portfolio investment 
overseas to zero, but there were limited leaks and concessions that offered some 
scope for a net increase in overseas portfolio holdings.
8 Still, the “investment 
currency premium” acted as an implicit tax on portfolio investments overseas 
and turnover was further suppressed during the 1960s and the 1970s by a 
“surrender arrangement” which required that 25 per cent of the proceeds of the 
sale of foreign currency securities be converted to pounds sterling at the less 
favourable official exchange rate.
9   
 
A plausible hypothesis is that the restrictions on overseas portfolio investment 
had an impact on the ownership structure of the UK’s publicly quoted 
companies. If British-based financial intermediaries had been operating in a 
fully deregulated environment, a logical reaction to scepticism concerning 
domestic corporate executives would have been to forsake domestic equity in 
favour of overseas investment opportunities. This, in turn, might have precluded 
the shift to dispersed ownership structures that took place in the decades 
following World War II. Exchange controls over capital movements in place 
potentially caused investors to conduct themselves differently. Since financial 
intermediaries would have been aware that there were significant costs 
associated with the overseas option, they might well have concluded that the 
prudent choice was to accept the risk that British companies suffered from 
managerial deficiencies and invest domestically regardless. The result would 
have been momentum in favour of increasingly dispersed share ownership that 
was driven at least partially by exchange controls.    
 
6.3  The Practical Effect of Regulation 
 
Data covering the period between 1979, when British residents became free to 
invest their money overseas, and 1985 suggests that exchange controls did 
affect choices made to some degree. For instance, during these years, there was 
an increase in foreign portfolio holdings from £12 billion to £100 billion (Bond 
et al. 1987: 5). Also, British life insurance companies increased the proportion 
of the assets they held in foreign corporate securities from 2.7 per cent in 1979 
to 9.3 per cent in 1985 while UK pension funds increased their share from 5.4 
per cent to 13.7 per cent (Bond et al. 1987: 28-29). The pattern was the same 
for unit trusts and investment trusts, with the corresponding figures being 19.8   19




Still, while restrictions on foreign portfolio investment did have a tangible 
impact, attributing the shift in the pattern of ownership and control experienced 
by UK companies in the decades following World War II to “trapped capital” 
ultimately seems unwise. One reason is that a “home bias” would have been in 
operation regardless of the regulatory milieu. A well-established fact in the 
financial economics literature is that, regardless of regulatory constraints, 
investors hold, on a risk-adjusted basis, too little of their wealth in foreign 
assets (Dahlquist et al., 2002: 1; Zhu, 2002: 1). Presumably, this home bias 
would have affected UK financial intermediaries from the end of the 1940s to 
the end of the 1970s.
11 Correspondingly, regardless of exchange controls, there 
would have been momentum in favour of the purchase of shares of UK 
companies.     
 
Statistics on the post-1979 portfolio allocations of British institutional investors 
also indicate that exchange controls probably did little to accelerate the 
dispersion of share ownership. If UK financial intermediaries in fact had serious 
reservations about the quality of management in British companies but bought 
domestic equity as a “second best” strategy, they should have responded to 
deregulation by switching out of UK shares in favour of the foreign option.  
Investment and unit trusts in fact did cut, as a proportion of total assets, their 
holdings of domestic equity between 1979 and 1985 (Bond et al., 1987: 29).  
Pension funds and insurance companies did likewise with domestic government 
securities and UK property (Bond et al., 1987: 29). Contrary, though, to what 
would have happened if a “trapped capital” effect was dictating a shift towards 
diffuse ownership of shares in British companies, pension fund holdings of 
domestic corporate equity increased from 44.1 per cent to 51.4 per cent of total 
investments between 1979 and 1985. The trend was the same for insurance 
companies, with the corresponding figures being 29.8 per cent and 36.1 per cent 
(Bond et al., 1987: 29). It follows that, despite the persistent accusations of 
mismanagement in British industry, financial intermediaries were content to 
own shares in UK companies regardless of options that might have been 
available to invest overseas.     
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7.  Conclusion 
 
In the contemporary discourse on corporate governance systems, little has been 
said about the quality of management. This presumably is because it has been 
taken for granted that there must be good managers in order for diffuse share 
ownership to become the norm in larger companies. The logic, after all, seems 
intuitively obvious since a primary benefit of a separation of ownership and 
control in a large business enterprise is the fostering of a beneficial division of 
labour between investment and management.   
 
Though the conjecture that good managers will necessarily be associated with a 
separation of ownership and control has a plausible ring to it, developments 
occurring in Britain cast doubt on the logic involved. The problem is that in the 
UK an outsider/arm’s length system of ownership and control became the norm 
in circumstances where serious doubts existed about the capabilities of British 
business leaders. There are various potential explanations for what happened. 
One possibility is that the case against British managers was weaker than has 
been supposed. During the decades following World War II, there was a shift in 
favour of greater meritocracy, better management training and increasingly 
sophisticated administrative hierarchies. Perhaps, then, managerial quality was 
high enough to allow those contemplating whether to buy shares in UK 
companies to feel sufficiently confident enough to proceed.   
 
Matters, however, cannot be left at this. Even if there were some improvements 
with respect to the management of British companies, many remain convinced 
that the country’s corporate leadership was seriously deficient during the period 
when dispersed ownership became the norm in larger business enterprises.   
Correspondingly, this paper has sought to explain why investors might have 
purchased shares in UK companies in circumstances where doubts existed 
about how well the firms were being run. Considerable stress has been placed 
on the position of institutional investors, since the rise of financial 
intermediaries as owners of corporate equity coincided with the move towards a 
separation of ownership and control. Essentially, it appears that equity became 
popular with financial intermediaries in the decades following World War II 
because they needed new outlets for a massive pool of new money flowing into 
the investment market. Also, as compared with fixed-income securities, the 
return on shares was good, at least when Britain was enjoying buoyant 
economic conditions during the 1950s and 1960s. In the face of these trends, 
potential managerial shortcomings apparently were not a pivotal driver with 
respect to investment decisions.   
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Overseas investment patterns also indicate that the quality of management in 
UK companies was not a serious concern for financial intermediaries as 
ownership separated from control. If those making investment decisions on 
behalf of institutional investors had been apprehensive about how well UK 
companies were being managed, a possible response would have been to shift 
assets overseas. The ability of investors to buy foreign securities was 
constrained, however, by exchange controls from 1947 to 1979. Still, it is 
unlikely that a “trapped capital” effect considerably strengthened the trend 
towards a separation of ownership and control in British companies. UK 
institutional investors admittedly did reduce the domestic orientation of their 
asset portfolio in some ways when exchange controls were lifted. Still, the 
re-weighting that took place did not betray a serious lack of confidence in the 
quality of British corporate executives since domestic companies grew in 
importance as a destination for investment for pension funds and insurance 
companies after 1979.   
 
A final observation. This paper has sought to explain, by reference to a 
transition to institutional investment, how a shift towards dispersed ownership 
occurred in the UK when serious doubts existed about the quality of British 
managers. An implicit assumption that has been made is that financial 
intermediaries would be the sort of arm’s-length investors which a separation of 
ownership and control implies. There was, however, an intriguing hypothetical 
opportunity for the reconcentration of share ownership around an institutional 
axis. Essentially, what could have taken place is that financial intermediaries, 
being aware of problems in Britain’s boardrooms, could have addressed the 
situation by taking large equity stakes in individual companies. They then 
would have acted as “hands on” monitors so as to remedy potential deficiencies 
in the quality of corporate decision-making (Kirby, 1994: 160; Roe, 1997: 17-
18).  
 
This sort of reconfiguration did not happen. Instead, even the largest financial 
intermediaries confined themselves where possible to a stake of less than 10 per 
cent of a company’s outstanding shares (Dennett, 1998: 316). Moreover, despite 
much exhortation to institutional investors to involve themselves in managerial 
decision-making, the traditional reaction to unsatisfactory corporate 
performance was either to dispose of existing holdings or to take some 
corrective measures behind the scenes (Briston and Dobbins, 1978: 5, 54).   
Open intervention in corporate affairs would only occur if there was patent 
evidence of mismanagement. 
 
What accounted for the passivity of Britain’s institutional investors?  Historians 
have had little to say on the point,
12 but plausible explanations can nevertheless   22
be advanced. For instance, Britain’s financial intermediaries may have taken a 
“hands-off” approach because of concerns that they suffered from limited 
institutional capabilities (top personnel were experts in investment rather than 
business) and that overt “interference” by institutions would foster calls for 
nationalisation (Briston and Dobbins, 1978: 56-57; Cheffins, 2001: 103, 106-7; 
Clayton and Osborn, 1965: 188-89). Additional research on the topic is 
required, however, to explain fully why, once ownership separated from control 
in circumstances where doubts existed about managerial quality, there was not a 
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Notes 
 
1    This did not mean that UK companies were free from criticism on the 
nepotism count.  See, for example, Jones and Barnes, 1967: 225; Florence, 
1972: 378. 
2   Not all observers agree (e.g. Whittington and Mayer, 2000: 178).    
3   A caveat is in order.  Since it has proved difficult to establish empirically 
that a shift to the multidivisional format yields superior returns, it cannot 
be taken for granted that hesitancy in Britain had serious adverse 
consequences.  See Fitzgerald, 1995: 36-38, 50; Gourvish, 1987: 40.  
4   For statistics covering from 1957 to 1972, see Prais, 1976: 117.  For a 
detailed analysis of trends with insurance companies, see Clayton and 
Osborn, 1965: 125, 131-36.   
5    On the distinction between “hard” information and “soft” or uncertain 
information, see Gilson and Kraakman, 1984: 561-63.      
6   The primary example of regulation was legislation specifying permissible 
trust fund investments where the trust deed was silent on the issue (Atkin, 
1977: 17-23).   
7   Within a week of the introduction of the regulatory regime in 1947, the 
premium reached 20% (Littlewood, 1998: 30).   
8   For statistics on actual fluctuations in portfolio investment abroad between 
1958 and 1968, see Cohen, 1972: 37.   
9   The 25 per cent surrender rule contributed more than £1 billion to Britain’s 
foreign exchange reserves between 1965 and 1978 (Bond et al., 1987: 23).   
10   Bond, Davis and Devereux, Capital, supra note xx, 29. 
11   The fact that after 1979 British investors failed to invest overseas to the 
extent that economic theory would predict (Bond et al., 1987: 58) lends 
support to this proposition.   
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